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Freund: Law Day Address--Law and the Education of the Citizen

LAW DAY ADDRESS
LAW AND THE EDUCATION OF THE CITIZEN
PAuL A. FimuNn*
A celebration of Law Day under academic auspices suggests
the subject of this talk. If I were asked to define the ABC's of
liberal education I would offer these three characteristics:
apprenticeship, breadth, and a critical spirit. Each of them, I
am persuaded, can be pursued in an especially fostering way
through an exposure to, or better an immersion in, the experience of the law.
To speak of apprenticeship in the context of a liberal education may seem to be a curious and contradictory conjunction. So
it would be if the meaning were the learning of a trade. But
what I have in mind is something deeper, a development of
intellectual and moral standards through absorption in the mind
and spirit of a master. The relationship may be an actual, personal one, or it may be vicarious, through study of another's life.
I speak with special feeling on this subject, because I had the
inestimable good fortune to serve for a year as law clerk to Mr.
Justice Brandeis, an experience that left a stronger impression
on my own thinking than any other before or since. I learned
then how a life can be lived in the law with whole-souled devotion to reason, persuasion, and the effective pursuit of an ideal.
When I came to work for the Justice he was seventy-six years
old, and his working day began at some pre-dawn hour that the
law clerk could identify only circumstantially, from the amount
of research and writing accomplished before the clerk's arrival
at a gentlemanly morning hour. I learned the morality of
craftsmanship from the dozens, even scores, of revisions through
which he put the drafts of his opinions. He used to say that the
Court owed its prestige to the fact that, almost alone among the
officialdom of the capital, the Justices did their own work. He
strongly opposed the elaborate new building for the Court, on
the ground that it would tend to make the authority of the Court
turn on external symbols and trappings instead of on the intrinsic reason of its opinions.
* Professor of Law, Harvard University School of Law. Delivered at the
Law Day Celebration and Banquet, University of South Carolina, April
21, 1967.
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I learned, too, how a simple basic philosophy can give unity
and strength to manifold endeavors to translate ideals into
reality through law. Brandeis believed that the function of
government is to promote the development of men, that responsibility is the great developer, and, at the same time, that the
limits of capacity in even the best of men are soon reached.
From these premises, grounded in experience, there followed the
need for diffusion of responsibility through the federal system
and for the sharing of responsibility in our industrial life. And
I learned how the commonplace controversies into which lawyers
are plunged can be made to serve as germinal points for imaginative and constructive measures of a broader sort-how a
resourceful mind can move from the particular to the general,
giving the general the solid underpinning of the concrete. Thus
Brandeis moved from the representation of insurance policyholders to the creation of a system of low-cost savings bank life
insurance, from the counselling of a subordinate officer in the
Interior Department who made accusations of corruption and
waste to a program for conservation of resources, from participation in labor disputes in the garment industry to a plan for
ongoing cooperation of management and labor. I learned, in
short, the meaning of Justice Holmes' reminder that a man may
live greatly in the law as well as elsewhere, that indeed at its
best the law provides a rare fusion of immediacy and perspective
for one who can master both microscope and telescope.
This leads me to the second of my ABC's-breadth. How can
a technical vocational subject like law furnish anything to
broaden the mind while sharpening it? It all depends on how you
take the subject. Archibald MacLeish has said that the study of
law (in which he excelled) was a better preparation for the craft
of poetry than his undergraduate liberal education. The latter
dealt too much in abstractions, while the law, like art itself,
must be saturated in human experience, and yet impose a measure of order on the disorder of experience without disrespect for.
the underlying diversity, spontaneity, and disarray.
On the spaciousness of law the finest statement I know is, not
surprisingly, a passage in an address by Holmes to an audience
of undergraduates:
All that life offers any man from which to start his thinking or his striving is a fact. And if this universe is one
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universe, if it is so far thinkable that you can pass in reason
from one part of it to another, it does not matter very much
what that fact is. For every fact leads to every other by the
path of the air. Only men do not yet see how, always. And
your business as thinkers is to make plainer the way from
some thing to the whole of things; to show the rational
connection between your fact and the frame of the universe.
If your subject is law, the roads are plain to anthropology,
the science of man, to political economy, the theory of
legislation, ethics, and thus by several paths to your final
view of life. It would be equally true of any subject. The
only difference is in the ease of seeing the way. To be master of any branch of knowledge, you must master those
which lie next to it; and thus to know anything you must
know all.
The third of the ABC's of a liberal education is the critical
spirit, the quality of mind that looks on what is in the light of
what was and what might be, that sees in the present a tension
between continuity and change, that strives to understand this
tension as the spring that keeps the watchworks of knowledge
and of society itself from running down. The joinder of tradition and revision, of heritage and heresy, is nowhere better
described than by Alfred N'orth Whitehead in his book on
symbolism:
It is the first step in sociological wisdom to recognize that
the major advances in civilization are processes which all
but wreck the societies in which they occur-like unto an
arrow in the hand of a child. The art of free society consists first in the maintenance of the symbolic code; and secondly in fearlessness of revision, to secure that the code
serves those purposes which satisfy an enlightened reason.
Those societies which cannot combine reverence to their
symbols with freedom of revision, must ultimately decay
either from anarchy, or from the slow atrophy of a life
stifled by useless shadows.
Law itself is preeminently
between conflicting rights,
May a state tax the receipts
For an answer we recite not

dialectical, seeking accommodations
a resolution of competing truths.
derived from interstate commerce?
one truth, but two: interstate com-
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merce shall not be trammeled, and interstate commerce must pay
its way. If a thing is misappropriated and finds its way into
the hands of an innocent person, who has the better claim to it,
the original owner or the transferee? Again we invoke values
in pairs: we must safeguard the rights of property, and we
should encourage the security of transactions. In each of these
problems, the solutions are, of course, remarkably complex and
refined, but they derive their solidity from the dialectic that
produces them. An ethical philosopher ignorant of law would
be astonished at the richness of the subject for his purposes.
Law is a powerful antidote to the most pernicious virus in current education-the cult of glibness, of one-dimensional thinking, and of thinking words, not things.
One contemporary issue that invites the use of the antidote is
the effect of recent Supreme Court decisions on the integrity of
our federal system. Unless we were to exalt verbalism and formalism over substance, any appraisal of this issue must commence with an inquiry into the values that a federal system is
meant to serve. Those values, I believe, can be subsumed under
two principal heads: the diffusion of political authority, and
participation, and the fostering of innovation and experimentation. Viewed in this light, the role of the Court has been superficially restrictive of federalism but on a deeper level protective
of the essential federal values. Decisions limiting state authority
over speech and press and assembly, and putting limits on qualifications required for voting, are in fact a vindication of that
diffusion of authority and breadth of participation that federalism seeks to promote. So perceived, the concern of the Court
over inequitable apportionment in voting districts, and over a
state law of libel that would penalize honest but mistaken political defamation, is a concern not hostile to, but supportive of, the
political ideals of federalism.
The only fair question is whether the Court has drawn its
lines and made its accommodations in the most sagacious way,
or whether it has emulated the little boy who said he knew how
to spell banana but didn't know when to stop. I happen to think
that the rule of numerical equality has been given too exclusive
a place in determining equal protection of the laws in reapportionment, but I can understand that a court might for practical
reasons fix on that one criterion for both houses of a legislature
in the interest of avoiding all the uncertainties that a more com-
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plex set of standards would draw in its train. Similarly I happen to think that the rule of privilege in the case of the
defamation of a public official-that the publisher is not liable
unless he acted with knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, the
falsity of the libel, ought not to be extended to the case where
the victim is not a public official but only a figure in the public
eye. The interest in unfettered public debate may be ill served
by a rule that makes private citizens vulnerable to defamation
if they dare to venture into the arena of debate on public issues.
Yet I can understand that a court might regard the distinction
between public officials and public figures as too shadowy for
application in the grey areas.
On the score of innovation and experiment, the Court has
actually liberated the states in their search for the necessary
wherewithal. Limitations on state taxation that abounded in the
1920's have been removed by more recent decisions: taxes on
income from federal sources are now legitimate, as are various
forms of taxes on receipts from interstate commerce. The basic
problems of state finances are now political, not justiciableabove all, how state revenues can be geared more closely to an
expanding gross national product, perhaps through a linkage
with the federal income tax by way of federal grants or federal
taxpayers' credit. The most diverse methods of cooperation have
been validated, whether they take the form of interstate compacts, conditional grants, tax credits, or regulatory federal laws
under the commerce clause, tailored to fit the divergencies of
local policy. Juridically our federalism, it has been aptly said,
resembles a layer cake less than it does a marble cake.
It is in the field of criminal law that the controversy over the
role of the Court now chiefly centers. The two principal targets
are the Mapp and Miranda decisions, the one requiring that evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure
be excluded, the other requiring that incriminating statements
elicited in a pre-trial interrogation be excluded unless there was
an opportunity to obtain counsel and the privilege to do so was
waived. Both decisions, it should be noted, were responses to
problems of judicial administration; they provide new instruments for the assurance of constitutional rights rather than creating new rights themselves. In Mapp, the right to be free of
illegal searches and seizures was protected in the only way
readily available to the Court, through a mandate concerning
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the use of evidence. But it by no means follows that the rule of
exclusion is constitutionally immutable. As a means, an instrument, to a constitutional end, not required for the integrity of
the trial process itself, it could be supplanted, in my judgment,
by a different prophylactic rule that promised at least equal
deterrence of unlawful official conduct. Thus if a state were to
provide that such evidence could be admitted in the discretion
of the trial judge (the English common law rule), while also
providing a sound and not an illusory civil remedy-as by an
action for liquidated and punitive damages against the state or
subdivision, with an allowance of counsel fees--I see no reason
to think that the experiment would be held invalid. Likewise
in the Mirandaproblem, it is noteworthy that the Court did not
place the decision on the sixth amendment right to counsel, but
on the fifth amendment right to be free of compulsion to
incriminate oneself. The provision of counsel here, like the rule
of exclusion in Mapp, is instrumental to a constitutional end.
In the Miranda opinion, indeed, the Court more than once
observed that the new standards were obligatory in the absence
of other equally effective assurances of the free exercise of the
privilege to remain silent. It would be interesting to see what
would be thought, for example, of a state practice under which
interrogation was conducted not in the presence of counsel but
before a magistrate. My purpose is not to consider the wisdom
of the solutions reached in these cases of criminal procedure,
but to suggest that even here the opportunities for diversity and
innovation are not entirely foreclosed.
The thrust of my remarks has been that the qualities of the
legal mind are needed outside the law as fully as inside, and
that within the law those qualities should not be looked for
solely in the judicial realm. In a democracy, Justice Frankfurter used to say, the most important office is that of citizen.
And in the legal system, I would add, the most important office
is that of lawyer. Are the judges in truth the conscience of the
country? They cannot be if a participatory democracy is to
function as it should. We will be truly civilized, I like to think,
when the Supreme Court is no longer front-page news, when the
judges need occupy no more exalted a place than John Maynard
Keynes hopefully foresaw for economists: when they would come
to serve like dentists, doing a bit of patchwork here and there,
but not responsible for the basic health of the society.
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